Recent Cases by unknown
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 10 
Issue 2 April 1945 Article 4 
1945 
Recent Cases 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Recent Cases , 10 MO. L. REV. (1945) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol10/iss2/4 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
Recent Cases
TAXATION-AVOIDANCE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXES THROUGH THE HOLDING
OF TAx-ExEMPT SECURITIES
State ex rel. St. Loids Uition Trust Co. v. Hoetiln
For several years Yantis, the decedent, had withdrawn the substantial part
of his bank deposits in May, ihe bank purchasing for his account United States
Treasury Bills maturing early in June, said Treasury Bills being left with the bank
with instructions to collect the face amount on maturity and deposit the proceeds
to his account. These certificates were not reported as taxable property held on
June 1st. The State Board of Equalization and the State Tax Commission found
that Yantis did not acquire the Treasury Bills as an investment,2 and that his
sole purpose was to evade the taxing laws of Missouri which levied a tax on all
property owned on June 1st, and held that this transaction was colorable and a
fraud upon the State. The estate of the deceased was assessed for the omitted
property and relator brought certiorari to quash the record. The court found
a bona fide, rightful ownership of tax-exempt certificates and ordered the record
quashed.
The courts are unanimous in declaring that a transaction is not illegal or
void3 solely because actuated by tax-avoidance motivesy4 yet presence of such
1. 351 Mo. 382, 173 S. W. (2d) 393 (1943).
2. The Commission seemed influenced by the fact that Yantis received no
income from the certificates but as the court said, "Of course, relator's bank account
did not produce any income either."; id. at 387, 173 S. W. (2d) 395.
3. Stilwell v. Corwin, 55 Ind. 433, 437 (1876) (Bank depositor surrendered
deposit certificate in exchange for a note by which the bank agreed to hold U. S.
bonds and to give them to him on demand. Depositor's administrator sues on
the note, the defense being that this was a fraudulent attempt to evade taxation.
Held: Agreement not void, for "Any person has a right to exchange money on
deposit in a bank for bonds on the United States, at any time, even if the express
purpose in the transaction was to exchange money which was taxable, for bonds
which were nor taxable"); Berridge v. Gaylord, 108 Kan. 105, 193 Pac. 1066 (1920)
(Defense to suit on note and mortgage was that payee on note was made one
other than creditor in order for latter to avoid taxes. Payee had assigned note to
true creditor who then sued. Defense not sustained.); Nance v. Merchants' Ferti-
lizer and Phosphate Co., 200 N. C. 702, 158 S. E. 486 (1931) (In suit for negligently
killing hogs the defense was that the plaintiff had not returned the hogs as taxable
property. Defense not allowed.); Note (1939) 118 A. L. R. 1175.
4. Iowa Bridge Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 39 F. (2) 777
(C. C. A. 8th, 1930) (Income tax case-even though transaction was to avoid
taxation it isn't for that reason alone illegal); Board of Commissioners of City of
Hoboken v. State Board of Taxes and Assessments, 107 N. J. Law 35, 151 Ati. 364
(1930), aff'd, 108 N. J. Law 195, 156 Aft. 377 (1931); People ex rel. Thurman
v. Ryan, 88 N. Y. 142 (1882); see United States v. Isham, 17 Wall. 496, 21 L. Ed.
728 (1873); Shotwell v. Moore, 129 U. S. 590, 9 Sup. Ct. 362 (1889); Lantz v. Hanna,
(138)
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motives prompts all courts to scrutinize a case more closely to ascertain whether
it has "crossed the line," ceasing to be tax avoidance and becoming tax evasion.
But as with all cases involving varying degrees of right or wrong, it is impossible
to make a sharp distinction between the permissible and the non-permissible. "We
do not speak of evasion, because, when the law draws a line, a case is on one side
of it or the other, and if on the safe side is none the worse legally that a party
has availed himself to the full of what the law permits. When an act is condemned
as an evasion, what is meant is that it is on the wrong side of the line indicated
by the policy if not by the mere letter of the law."5
A common method of minimizing taxes is the holding of tax-exempt securi-
ties on tax assessment day, but such a policy subjects the property owner to the
scrutiny of the authorities when the securities are held for a short time only, being
purchased immediately preceding tax day and sold immediately thereafter. The
court is then confronted with a difficult choice for on the one hand the statute
requires that the tax be computed on the basis of taxable property held on tax
day and it is apparent that the taxpayer held none, yet on the other hand it is
evident that this was a manipulation with the sole purpose of avoiding taxation.
Which factor should be the determining one?6 The majority of the courts, feeling
111 Kan. 461, 207 Pac. 767 (1922); Commonwealth v. Harris, 118 S. W. 294 (Ky.
1909); Holly Springs Savings and Insurance Co. v. Marshall County, 52 Miss. 281,
289 (1876) ("We must not be understood as holding that government bonds are
taxable merely because the motive for their purchase was to escape taxation.
Neither do we intimate that they must be held for any particular time, or be
bought with any intention of holding them for any period whatever. They may be
bought solely because of their non-taxable character and disposed of at the very
earliest practicable moment, and such purchase will not subject them to taxation."
The Missouri court in the instant case relied strongly on this argument); State ex rel.
Orr v. Buder, 308 Mo. 237, 271 S. W. 508 (1925); Wachovia Bank and Trust
Co. v. Nash County, 196 N. C. 704, 146 S. E. 861 (1929); Robert Jemison, Jr.,
as Trustee of Forest Park Realty Co., 3 B. T. A. 780, 803 (1926) (Income tax
case---"The fact that by the procedure taken the corporation avoided a tax is not
sufficient reason, in the absence of proof of fraud, to hold the transaction other
than what it actually was."). ,
'5. Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 630, 36 Sup. Ct. 473, 474 (1916); United
States v. Wurzbach, 280 U. S. 396. 399, 50 Sup. Ct. 167, 169 (1930) ("Wherever the
law draws a line there will be cases very near each other on opposite sides. The
precise course of the line may be uncertain, but no one can come near it without
knowing that he does so, if he thinks, and if he does so, it is familiar to the criminal
law to make him take the risk.") PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION (1937).
6. Cases wherein taxation was not sustained although taxpayer's intention
was apparent: United States v. Isham, 17 Wall. 496, 21 L. Ed. 728 (1873) (Isham
used an instrument similar to a promissory note but which wasn't one in form.
Tax on promissory notes did not apply.); City of Dallas v. Higginbotbam-Bailey-
Logan Co., 37 F. (2d) 513 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930) (part of the business policy);
Commonwealth v. Harris, 118 S. W. 294 (Ky. 1909) (not shown that government
bonds were later sold although decision doesn't hinge on this); Dixon County v.
Halstead, 23 Neb. 697, 37 N. W. 621 (1888) (no showing of intention to sell
shortly); Board of Commissioners of Hoboken v. State Board of Taxes and Assess-
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that the taxpayer's responsibility of carrying his proportionate share of the govern-
ment costs should not be dodged in such an open-faced manner, find (a) this
is a fraud against the stateJ (b) that this is a colorable transaction,8 (c) or that
there was not a bona fide purchase and sale.0
In such cases, however, the fact remains that the taxpayer actually owns tax-
exempt property on assessment day. Who can say whether or not fraud is present?
How long must a taxpayer own such securities before he can dispose of them
without being guilty of a "colorable" transaction? When is the purchase of govern-
ment bonds bona fide? What of one who purchases tax-exempt bonds on May
31st, intending to make a permanent investment, yet is forced to convert them
into cash early in June due to unexpected contingencies? What standard can be
established by which we can determine who shall be exempt from taxation of his
government securities, and who shall not be exempt due to his fraud in purchasing
the bonds solely for the purpose of tax evasion?
It is clear that if there is not a bona fide purchase of tax-exempt securities, no
exemption can be claimed. "Not bona fide" is often loosely used as a "catch all"
for situations in which it is felt that the taxpayer should not be permitted to
avoid taxation through such an artificial investment. It seems, however, that
a transaction is not bona fide wherein the taxpayer makes an agrement with his
bank whereby a few days prior to tax day it is to charge his account for the pur-
ments, 107 N. J. Law 35, 151 Atl. 364 (1930), aff'd., 108 N. J. Law 195, 156 At.
377 (1931); Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Nash County, 196 N. C. 704, 146
S. E. 861 (1929).
7. Automobile Acceptance Corporation v. Hopkins, 121 Cal. App. 168, 8
P. (2d) 509 (1932);4n re People's Bank of Vermont, 203 I11. 300, 67 N. E. 777
(1903) (court placed emphasis on the fact that the bank never had physical pos-
session of the bonds); Holly Springs Savings and Insurance Co. v. Marshall
County, 52 Miss. 281, 288 (1876) (". . . fraud vitiates everything into which
it enters, and nullifies the advantages which fair dealing would have conferred");
Jones v. Seward County, 10 Neb. 154 (1880); Poppleton v. Yamhill County, 8
Ore. 338 (1880) ($12,000 in notes assigned to secure a note of $1,000 in another
county. Court found the security too disproportionate and that this was a fraud
against the assessing county); Highland Park Independent School Dist. of Dallas
County v. Republic Insurance Co., 80 S. W. (2) 1053, 1061 (Tex. Civ. App.
1934) ("If such bonds were purchased with the sole intent of evading taxation,
then such an action would be fraudulent and render said sum subject to taxes.")
8. Board of Commissioners of City of Hoboken v. State Board of Taxes and
Assessments, 107 N. J. Law 35, 151 At. 364 (1930) (spoke of cited cases as in-
volving colorable transactions which are not genuine and without reservation);
Holly Springs Savings and Insurance Co. v. Marshall County, 52 Miss. 281 (1876)
(the court will investigate whether the holding of securities is colorable only).
9. Holly Springs Savings and Insurance Co. v. Marshall County, 52 Miss.
281 (1876) (the court investigates to see whether the holding of government
bonds is bona fide); cf. Commonwealth v. Harris, 118 S. W. 294, 295 (Ky. 1909)
(The court found a bona fide transaction but said, "Of course, if the evidence
had shown that the defendant only made a pretended sale of his bonds for the
purpose of hiding them and escaping taxation, undoubtedly they could be assessed
in his hands as omitted pr'operty.")
Vol. 10
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chase price of bonds, said bonds being "sold" to him from the bank's portfolio and
then being "purchased" back a few days after tax day-the entire transaction being
accomplished by bookkeeping entries.10 Less predictible cases arise when there
is no pre-arranged agreement with the bank and as far as it knows the depositor
actually purchased the securities for investment purposes and only when he later
sells them back to the bank is it advised of the true nature of the transaction.
Even then, the majority of the courts find there is no "bona fide" purchase."
One degree further removed is the instant case for although there was a pre-
arranged plan with the bank, it was not that the bank should "sell" and "buy"
the bonds with bookkeeping entries. Yantis had the bank buy the bonds, direct-
ing it to hold them until their redemption date, dispose of them, and credit his
account with the proceeds. Admitting that it was not a coincidence that the
bonds matured shortly after June 1st, the fact remains that Yantis had actually
purchased them and could not have held them longer had he so desired. "Here
the only reason Yantis received money for these bonds, when he did, was because
the United States Government had issued non-taxable bonds maturing so soon
10. No case involving property taxes has been found which clearly illustrates
this type situation. Stimson v. Commissioner of Internal, Revenue, 55 F. (2d) 815
(C. C. A. 8th, 1932), cert. den., 286 U. S. 555, 52 Sup. Ct. 579 (1932) (is in
point as to facts, but income tax is concerned and the court found an absolute
sale of taxable securities and a valid purchase of government bonds); Stilwell v.
Corwin, 55 Ind. 433 (1876) (similar facts but case involved suit on written
promise of bank to deliver the government bonds to its depositor on demand);
Automobile Acceptance Corporation v. Hopkins, 121 Cal. App. 168, 8 P. (2d) 509
(1932) (not as obvious as a mere bookkeeping entry but the court pointed out
that the banks knew the purpose of the company since they allowed it to borrow
on unsecured notes so as to comply with the statute in question); Whiting Finance
Co. v. Hopkins, 115 Cal. App. 756, 2 P. (2d) 461 (1931) (involved the same
facts as the Automobile Acceptance Corporation case); See State ex rel. St. Louis
Union Trust Co. v. Hoehn, 351 Mo. 382, 389, 173 S. W. (2d) 393, 396 (1943) (This
court indicates that such a transaction would not be bona fide by saying that
Yantis wouldn't be liable unless he still owned the bank deposit and "That could
only be true if there were some strings attached to the deal by some understanding
that it was not an actual purchase and sale but was in fact some other kind of
transaction.")
11. Mitchell v. Board of Commissioners of Leavenworth County, 91 U. S.
206, 208 (1875) (Mitchell withdrew cash from bank, purchased greenbacks, sealed
them in an envelope, left them in bank vault, and after tax day, deposited the
greenbacks. While cited as authority for and against this type transaction, all
the case can be said to hold is that "a court of equity will not knowingly use its
extraordinary powers to promote such a scheme, etc."); Shotwell v. Moore, 129
U. S. 590, 9 Sup. Ct. 362 (1889); Durham v. State ex rel. Anderson, 6 Ind. App. 23,
32 N. E. 104 (1892); Crowder v. Riggs, 153 Ind. 158, 53 N. E. 1019 (1899);
Jones v. Seward County, 10 Neb. 154 (1880) (While there doesn't appear to have
been any prior understanding with the purchasing agency, this seems to be a trans-
action'which could have been handled by bookkeeping entries only); Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co. v. Nash- County, 196 N. C. 704, 146 S. E. 861 (1929) (bought
and sold the bonds on the open market-transaction upheld as valid).
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after June 1st, 1941. Certainly it was not illegal or improper to buy them because
of that fact."
12
Although no infallible rule can be developed whereby one can predict whether
there has been a bona fide purchase of tax-exempt securities which will not be
a fraud against the state, certain factors which have motivated the courts in their
decisions are discernible:
1. It may be felt that an essential source of governmental revenue is obtained
through borrowing and that "Investors are . . . induced to buy government bonds,
notwithstanding the fact that they bear interest at a less rate than other sound
investments. These investors rely upon the integrity of the statutory provisions
exempting such bonds from taxation. Good faith to purchasers and holders of
such bonds demands that the integrity of these statutory provisions . . . shall not
be impaired by . . .judicial construction."1" To tax such bonds after the issuing
authority has declared them to be tax-exempt would impair the credit of the bor-
rower and directly increase the tax burden.
2. Frequently the purchase of tax-exempt securities does not deprive the
state of any tax revenue since the purchase is from some individual or financial
institution in whose hands the bonds were not assessable but who will be assessed
on the cash received from the sale of the bonds.14 If, however, the purchase was
12. State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hoehn, 351 Mo. 382, 389, 173
S. W. (2d) 393, 396 (1943).
13. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Nash County, 196 N. C. 704, 707, 146
S. E. 861, 862 (1929); Lantz v. Hanna, 111 Kan. 461, 207 Pac. 767 (1922); GRAY,
LIMITATIONS OF TAXING POWER (1906) § 755 (tax on possession of government
bonds makes them less desirable and impairs borrowing power of the federal gov-
ernment); See Pullen v. Corporation Commission, 152 N. C. 524, 540, 68 S. E. 155,
163 (1910) (Concurring opinion: Bank purchased state bonds at a large premium,
relying upon a statute authorizing their deduction from surplus in valuing capital
stock. ". . . good faith and fair dealing require" that the court allow the bank
to deduct these bonds); cf. Holly Springs Savings and Insurance Co. v. Marshall
County, 52 Miss. 281, 289 (1876) ("It is urged, however, that the non-taxability
of the national securities is guaranteed by the federal government; that their exemp-
tion from taxation constitutes one of the main ingredients of their value, and that
this cannot be infringed by the state . .. yet ... there remains power in the
courts to investigate whether the holding is actual and bona fide, or colorable only,
and fraudulent . . . the courts will look through- the sham, and measure the
rights of the parties by the real nature of the transaction.")
14. Commonwealth v. Harris, 118 S. W. 294, 295 (Ky. 1909) ("The com-
monwealth loses nothing by a bona fide transfer of property, although the transfer
may be made just before assessment day, etc."); State ex rel. Orr v. Buder, 308
Mo. 237, 271 S. W. 508 (1925) (says that the state would gain nothing by taxing
the securities for then the company could not afford to hold them and would
dispose of them to persons who could hold them as non-taxable); Wachovia Bank
and Trust Co. v. Nash County, 196 N. C. 704, 146 S. E. 861 (1929) (changing
of ownership doesn't relieve the owner of the taxable property on tax day from the
liability of taxes); cf. Holly Springs Savings and Insurance Co. v. Marshall County,
52 Miss. 281 (1876) (Court fears that the bankers of the country can shift tax-
exempt securities from city to city so as to meet tax day in each state and thus
5
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from a bank which is assessed on its average taxable holdings while the individual
is taxed on his property as of the one day, the state will be deprived 6f revenue
and the court may feel justified in finding fraud against the state.
3. The business of the taxpayer may be such that it is to his advantage to
own tax-exempt securities for a short time extending over tax day in order to:
(a) avoid taxation, (b) earn more interest than a bank could pay, (c) and still
have readily-liquidated assets available. While tax avoidance is one motivating
factor it is not the sole consideration and the court will be justified in finding a
bona fide ownership of the securities.D
4. Should there be a statute declaring one to be liable for a penalty if he
temporarily converts his personal property into nontaxable property for the fraudu-
lent purpose of evading the payment of taxes the court can follow the statute
literally, not taxing the tax-exempt securities but assessing a penalty against their
owner for his fraudulent purpose.""
A conflict of interests arises when through a pre-arranged plan with his bank
a taxpayer disposes of taxable securities (at a profit) shortly before tax day, pur-
chasing tax-exempt United States bonds with- the proceeds, selling said bohds
through the same bank and repurchasing at the "sales" price the very same taxable
securities a few days after tax day-the bank accomplishing the entire transaction
by means of bookkeeping entries. Since the tax avoidance purpose is obvious a
court might find that this was not a bona fide transaction and that the taxpayer
is subject to personal property taxes. But if suit were not for property taxes but
deprive the state of income and at the same time not benefiting the federal
government since only a proportionately few bonds would be necessary). It
must be remembered that some bonds are purchased direct from the government
and so the cash will not be in a position to be assessed on tax day.
15. City of Dallas v. Higginbotham-Bailey-Logan Co., 37 F. (2d) 513, 515
(C. C. A. 5th, 1930) (Operator of large mercantile business made large collections
in the fall and purchased government bonds before tax day, selling them later
to retire outstanding obligations incurred when cash had been borrowed with which
to take advantage of cash discounts offered. Since several factors were present it
was said, "We do not think a court would be justified in concluding that the sole
purpose was to defraud the city of its revenue.") Some courts have taxed bonds
held for a short time if it was clear they were not purchased in the line of business:
Whiting Finance Co. v. Hopkins, 115 Cal. App. 756, 2 P. (2d) 461 (1931) (Finance
company was taxed on solvent credits with an allowed deduction of outstanding
debts. It borrowed large sums from banks, purchased government bonds, deducted
the debts from credits, and claimed exemption from taxation on the intangible
property. Court found that the transaction involved an immediate financial loss
and clearly was not in the line of 'business of the investment company); Automobile
Acceptance Corp. v. Hopkins, 121 Cal. App. 168, 8 P. (2d) 509 (1932).
16. Durham v. State ex rel. Anderson, 6, Ind. App. 23, 32 N. E. 104 (1892)
(The action wasn't to tax treasury notes but was to recover a statutory penalty
for tax evasion).
6
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for income taxes instead, would the court be justified in taxing as income the
capital gain realized on the "sale" of the taxable securities?17
The necessity of distinguishing between evasion and avoidance is disposed
of when the individual is assessed on the average amount of taxable property held
during the year,"" and the problem is greatly lessened when intangibles are taxed
only in proportion to their income-producing ability, thus eliminating the urge
to resort to devious schemes as heretofore discussed. Missouri has recently adopted
the latter plan in its new constitution which provides, "and the tax shall be based
on the annual yield and shall not exceed eight per cent thereof."19
T. H. PARRISHI
17. Stimpson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 55 F. (2d) 815 (C. C. A.
8th, 1932), cert. den., 286 U. S. 555, 52 Sup. Ct. 597 (1932) (The court found
an actual sale resulting in a taxable gain despite petitioner's contention that there
was no sale because the bank had no power to make a sale to itself. The court
took judicial notice of the fact that the United States bonds weren't taxable by
Missouri on June 1st, thus indicating her intention but, "Consideration of this
statute in connection with the facts disclosed in the record does not raise an
ugly imputation against petitioner as her counsel suggests. Actual sale of property
prior to the incidence of a tax thereon is not illegal, even though the sale is
made in order to avoid liability for the tax.")
18. Shotwell v. Moore, 129 U. S. 590, 598, 9 Sup. Ct. 362, 364, (1889) (Ohio
statute authorized assessment on basis of average taxable holdings. "So far as we can
see, the statute which does this does not tax the citizen for the greenbacks which he
may have held at any time during the year, but taxes him upon the money, credits.
or other capital which he has had and used, according to the average monthly
amount he has so held"); Lantz v. Hanna, 111 Kan. 461, 207 Pac. 767 (1922)
(Kansas had a statute which taxed on average taxable holdings during the
year but it was held unconstitutional as denying equal protection since amounts
invested in state and local tax-exempt securities held on tax day were completely
exempted.) The Missouri court in the instant case directs attention to the fact
that the "period" method is used in assessing merchants but that "The Legislature
has not seen fit to apply it to property taxes and neither the executive nor judicial
branch of the Government may do so," 351 Mo. 382, 392, 173 S. W. (2d) 393, 397
(1943).
19. Mo. CONST. 1945, Art. X, § 4.
7
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1945
